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returns and would 
statute. It follows 
fusing to require 
federal tax returns. 
The judgment is 
Carter, 
EsTATE oF HEARD C.2d 
to defeat the 
that the trial court not err in re-
of of either the state or 
affirmed. 
McComb, J., 
and J. pro tern.,• concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied January 
23, 1958. Bray, J. pro tern.,* participated therein in place 
of Shenk, J. 
[L. A. No. 24185. In Bank. Dec. 31, 1957.] 
Estate of EMMA C. HEARD, Deceased. BANK OF AMER-
ICA NATIONAL 'fRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIA-
TION (a National Banking A8sociation), as '£ru8tee, etc., 
Petitioner v. 1\WS'l' WORSHIPFUL GRAND LODGE 
OF FREE AND ACCEP'l'ED MASONS (an fTnincor-
porated Association) et al., Appellants; SHIRLEY T. 
HEARD, as Guardian, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Wills-Designation of Takers-"Children."-The term "chil-
dren" in a will may include adopted children though adopted 
after testator's death. 
[2] Adoption-Inheritance by Adopted Child.-Wills must be read 
and construed in harmony with the legislative policy of plac-
ing adopted children on a level with natural born offspring. 
[3] Wills-Designation of Takers-''Issue."---The word "issue" 
includes all descendants, and since the statute gives to an 
adopted child the status of a descendant, all the legal con-
sequences and incidents thereof follow, the same as though the 
child was born in lawful wedlock. 
[1] Adopted child as within class in testamentary gift, notes, 
70 A.L.R. 621; 144 A.L.R. 670. See also Cal.Jur., Wills, § 247; 
Am.Jur., Wills, § 1363. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 329; [2] Adoption, § 39; [3, 
8] Wills, § 325; [4] Contracts, § 141; [5, 7] Wills, § 266; [6] 
Wills, § 330. 
*Assigned by Chairman of J udieial Council. 
Dec.1957] EsTATE oF HEARD 
[49 C.2d 514; 319 P.2d 637] 
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Contracts-Interpretation-Meaning of Words.-Words in a 
private instrument should ordinarily, in the absence of a 
showing of contrary intent, be given the effect given them by 
statutory or ease law. 
[5] Wills-Construction.-Testamentary provisions should be con-
strued as far as in harmony with law and 
[6] !d.-Designation of Takers-"Adopted" Children.-The Su-
preme Court cannot suppose that wills are made in a vacuum, 
that the status of an adopted child, being the same as a bio-
logical offspring, may be completely ignored, or that it was 
ignored by a testator when making a will any more than he 
may be said to ignore other rules of law and public policy; 
when he has not said anything about "adopted" children, 
using that word or the equivalent, the court must assume, un-
less a contrary intent is expressed, that his will would be 
compatible with the general body of law and public policy. 
[7] Id.-Construction.-Courts by necessity draw on statutes, case 
law and public policy in construing an instrument, such as a 
will, since they must suppose that the draftsman did not 
intend to pursue a course contrary to them unless he so states. 
[8] !d.-Designation of Takers-"Lawful Issue."-A testamen-
tary disposition of the residue of a trust to the "lawful issue" 
of testatrix' son, if he he deceased, includes his adopted child 
in the absence of anything to show a contrary intent, in view 
of the public policy to treat adopted children the same as 
blood children; the fact that prior to the 1955 amendment of 
Prob. Code, § 257, it had been indicated that adopted children 
inherit from but not through their adoptive parents is not 
significant. 
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Kern 
County instructing a testamentary trustee. Robert B. Lam-
bert, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
No appearance for Petitioner. 
Henry C. Clausen, Henry C. Clausen, Jr., Thomas .J. Cun-
ningham, John E. Landon and William R. Hulsey for Ap-
pellants. 
Couron, Heard & James and Calvin H. Couron, Jr., for 
Respondent. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 142 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts, 
§ 236 et seq. 
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CARTER J.-Emma Heard, testatrix, a widow, died on 
November 23, 1939, leaving a will dated September 28, 1935. 
At the time of her death her blood relatives were a brother 
and a son, John, who was 42 years old, married to a woman 
36 years old, but with no children. (He had been married 
before and She left a small bequest to her brother 
and others John, but the major portion of her 
estate she left to the Bank of America, National Trust and 
Savings Association (also named executor), in trust to pay 
from the income: $200 per month for life to John; $50 
per month to JYirs. Cummings (testatrix' cousin) for life; 
$25 to one Rice for life; $50 to a servant, Eulalia, for life; 
$25 a month for the care of a dog; the remainder of the 
income was to be paid monthly to John ''or if he be deceased, 
then to his lawful issue, if any, distributed per stirpes and 
not per capita" but if John should "leave no lawful issue 
at the time of his death" then the income shall be paid to 
May Cummings until her death and then to her "living 
issue. " 1 If the income is not sufficient to pay all the pay-
ments above mentioned, the income should first be paid to 
John "or in case of his death to his lawful issue." If the 
income payable to John is not sufficient to provide for his 
needs, the trustee may make additional payments from the 
corpus and the same is true as to the ''lawful issue'' of John 
if he should die before the termination of the trust. 
The trust shall terminate on the death of the "last sur-
vivor of all," the persons, that is Rice, May Cumming's 
issue and including the "lawful issue" of John who may be 
living when the testatrix dies and the cessation of Eulalia's 
employment during testatrix' life. Upon the termination of 
the trust, the corpus is to be "forthwith and outright paid 
over and delivered to the heirs of the lawful issue" of John 
but if "at" the termination of the trust "there should not 
then be living any lawful issue of" ,John, then the residue 
shall be paid over to appellants herein. There are spend-
thrift provisions, a contest clause, and a specification of the 
trustee's powers and compensation. 
The trustee petitioned for instructions under section 1120 
of the Probate CodE'2 on how thE' property sl1onld be dis-
'In separate paragraphs it is provided that "Upon the death" of John 
"the residue of income shall be distributed among his lawful issue, if 
any, by right of representation," and if no i~sue the "accrued" income 
to May Cummings. 
'"When a trust created by a will continues after distribution, the 
superior court shall not lose jurisdiction of the estate by final distribu· 
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trilmted and it appears from the that John died on 
1955; died but her issue are still 
alive; Eulalia was not employed by testatrix at the latter's 
tl.:nth; Rice is still alive; the dog is dead; hence the trust 
is not terminated; and on October 19, 1950, John and 
hi~ wife in this state ,John III, respondent herein, 
\n1s at that time about 7 years old, and his adoptive 
wother appears herein as his guardian; that the testatrix, 
reference to "lawful issue" of ,John intended to include 
adopted children including rrspondent; that respondent is 
entitled to the first $200 income; that the trust is not termi-
nated, accordingly an order was entered instructing the 
trustee to pay from the income $200 per month to respondent, 
then $25 monthly to Rice and the balance to respondent. 
Appellants3 appeal from that order. \V"hile it is clear the 
trust has not yet been terminated beeause Rice is still alive 
and the appellants, children of May Cummings, are still alive. 
who claim the income that was to go to John if he died 
without lawful issue; and the other appellants appeal because 
they feel the determination that respondent, .John's adopted 
son, was John's lawful issue, thus excluding May Cummings' 
two children from the income, might be res judicata on that 
question when the trust is terminated. 
This estate has been on appeal before in .Estate of Heard, 
25 Cal.2d 322 [153 P.2d 553], which hrld the trust provisions 
yalid and that the lawful issue of John would take on termi-
nation of the trust, and found invalid one paragraph of the 
will, not here important. (See also .Estate of Heard, 107 Cal. 
App.2d 225 [236 P.2d 810, 27 A.L.R.2d 1313].) Accounts 
have been heretofore filed by the trustee and the estate was 
distributed to the trustee on the trusts as stated in the will. 
The sole issue presented is whether "lawful issue" of John 
included a child he adopted after the will was made and the 
testatrix was dead. 
tion, but shall retain jurisilietion for the purpose of determining to whom 
the property shall pass and be delivered upon final or partial termina-
tion of tbe trust, to the extent that sueh determination is not concluded 
by the decree of distribution, of settling the a~counts and passing upon 
the acts of the trustee and for the other purposes hereinafter set forth . 
. . . The trustee may also petition such court, from time to time, for in-
structions as to the administration of the trust." (Pro b. Code, ~ 1120.) 
An appeal may be taken from an order giving instructions. (Estate of 
Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 [293 P.2d 778] .) 
"Three of appellants are the ones to receive the corpus of the trust 
on its tennination if John left no lawful issue, the other two appellants 
(May Cummings' issue) were to receive the income from the trust if 
John died without lawful issue. 
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In whether John III was lawful issue in the 
will it was stipulated that the will was drawn by a lawyer; 
that appellants La Berge and Norris Cummings are the issue 
of May and the second cousins of the testatrix. John was 
married in 1933 before the will was made and testatrix died; 
he was in ill health. The adoption of John III took place 
later. 
[1] The term "children" in a will may include adopted 
children although adopted after the testa tor's death. (Estate 
of Stanford, ante, p. 120 [315 P.2d 681]; Meek v. Ames, 
177 Kan. 565 [280 P.2d 957] .) 'rhe same has been applied to 
"heirs" (see Majm· v. Ilammer, -- Ky. -- [258 S.W.2d 
506]); to "descendants, heirs or survivors" (Hayes v. St. 
Louis Union Trttst Co., -- Mo. -- [280 S.W.2d 649] ; St. 
Louis Union Trust Co. v. -- Mo. -- [282 
S.W.2d 474]); to "lawful issue" (see Riddle v. Peters Trust 
Co., 147 Neb. 578 [24 N.W.2d 434]; see also 70 A.L.R. 621; 
144 id. 670). It is said in In re Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y. 
366 [107 N.E.2d 492, 494]: "Embodied in our adoption 
statute is the fundamental social concept that the relationship 
of parent and child, with all the personal and property rights 
incident to it may be established, independently of blood ties, 
by operation of law . . . 'In the eye of the law, therefore, 
adopted children are lineal descendants of their foster par-
ent. They are in the line of descent from him through the 
command of the statute, the same as if that line had been 
established by nature.' Matter of Cook's Estate, 187 N.Y. 
253, 261 [79 N.E. 991, 994]. In harmony with the legislative 
policy thus expressed, the adoption statute has been most 
liberally and beneficently applied. . . . 
[2] ''Wills, too, must be read and construed in harmony 
with the legislative policy of placing adopted children on a 
level with natural born offspring. See Gnliam v. Gua.ranty 
Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127. 138 [78 N.E. 697, 700] ; Matter of 
Ellis' Estate, 178 Misc. 491,492 [34 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885]." It 
has been held with reference to the anti-lapse statute (see 
Pro b. Code, § 92) that an adopted child is a ''lineal descend-
ant" of his adoptive parents. (Estate of Esposito, 57 Cal. 
App.2d 859 [135 P.2d 167] ; Estate of Tibbetts, 48 Cal.App. 
2d 177 [119 P.2d 368) ; Estate of J!Ioore, 7 Cal.App.2d 722 
[47 P.2d 533, 48 P.2d 28]; see Estate of Winchester, 140 
Cal. 468 [74 P. 10].) [3] It is said in the Winchester case 
at page 469: "In Pierce v. Rickard, 18 R.I. 142, it was held 
that by the well-settled current of authority the word 'issue' 
Dec. EsTATE oF HEARD 
[4!1 C.2d 514; 319 P.2d 637] 
includes aU and as the statute gives to an 
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ch!ild the status a descendant, all the ~egal conseqtwnces 
and incidents thereof follow, the same as though the child was 
born in lawful wed~ock. (Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 646.) 
In Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, it was held that a legally 
child is a lineal descendant of its adopting parents 
and if, as declared by the Civil Code, an adopted child is to 
be 'regarded and treated in all respects as the child of the 
person adopting,' and the two 'sustain towards each other 
the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights 
and be subject to all the duties of that relation,' it must 
follow that the children of such adopted child take by in-
heritance as issue of the adopting father. [Citations.] Other-
wise, the child adopted and the adopting parent would not 
sustain towards each other the relation of parent and child. 
[Citation.] In the Estate of Wardell, 57 CaL 491, it is said: 
'The term "child" as used in Civil Code, section 1307, of the 
law of descent and succession must relate to status, not to 
origin.'" (Emphasis added.) Certainly some consideration 
must be given to such construction of statutes when we are 
considering private instruments. 
We have pointed out in Estate of Stanford, ante, p. 120 
[315 P.2d 681], the policy in this state to give to an adopted 
child the same status as a biological one, and that the Estate of 
Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 265 [196 P.2d 1], merely holds that there 
was sufficient evidence aside from the face of the will to show 
the testator intended lawful issue not to include adopted 
children. At the time the will here involved was prepared 
and at the time of the death of the testatrix section 257 of 
the Probate Code provided: "An adopted child succeeds to the 
estate of one who has adopted him, the same as a natural 
child; and the person adopting succeeds to the estate of an 
adopted child, the same as a natural parent. An adopted 
child does not succeed to the estate of a natural parent when 
the relationship between them has been severed by the adop-
tion, nor does such natural parent succeed to the estate of 
such adopted child.'' (But sec 1955 amendment to section 
257 which broadens scope of inheritance by adopted child.) 
In an excellent article by Professor Jacobus tenBroek (see 
22 So.Cal.I.J.Rev. 89; 6 Hastings L.J. 261), it is pointed out 
in detail the effect of adoption, its Rteady increase and the 
necessity that an adopted child be treated the same as a 
biological child of the adoptive parents, and it is said : ''If 
the genetic connection is what is meant, then it must be noted 
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that the act of transmission is in a compara-
tively short time and does not necessarily involve any afte-r-
contact or relationship. Is this 'natural relation' more nat-
ural or more important than the mutual, reciprocal and con-
tinuous relation between parent and child, which may occur 
in adoptive or non-adoptive involved in the rearing 
of a child from infancy to with all of the impact 
of day-to-day care and upbringing upon character, psychol-
ogy, outlook, emotional make-up, and even biology which 
that entails¥ In this sense, does not nature 'do the work of 
nature' and create one a child who by nature is a stranger T 
In fact, in this sense, does not nature do the work of nature 
and create one a child who by nature is not a stranger? ... 
"The over-all purpose of these sections, taken together 
with Civil Code, Section 221, evidently was to create a new 
legal relationship of parent and child which normally would 
be coupled with the natural relation of parent and child 
springing from the fact that that is the relationship in which 
they actually live; and to make the new legal relationship 
legally the same as the old legal relationship of parent and 
child which normally is coupled both with the genetic and 
the factual natural relation of parent and child. . . . 
"In general, despite the persistent emergence of these 
underlying conceptions, the California Supreme Court has 
taken the statutory language seriously. It has held that: 
the adoptive parent has the same right to paramount custody 
as the biological parents anrl, after adoption, guardianship of 
the adopted child is therefore improper. The residence of 
the adopting parent becomes the residence of the child ; 
adopted children are within the term 'any lineal descendant' 
and are thus exempted from the burden of a collateral inheri-
tance tax; an adopted child is a 'child' within the meaning 
of Section 1365 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus en-
titled to letters of administration of the estate of the adopt-
ing parent; a court having control of a child's custody by 
virtue of the divorce of its parents is ousted of its jurisdiction 
by adoption; 'an adoptive parent may contract with the 
natural parents to take care of, support and educate the 
adopted child for compensation as freely and legally as such 
contract could be made by the adoptive parent with a stranger 
to the blood of such child'; an adopted child is not part of 
the immediate family of his biological father for the purpose 
of having set aside as exempt property insurance proceeds 
paid into the estate of such father. 
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''The California to the same 
line with 
and child. In In 
7 Am.St.Rep. ] , the 
from the adoptive 
the adoption statutes. 
' said the 'extend 
natural and children. IS 
The use of section 1386, 
does not limit the of inheritance the natural children 
only. . .. The word "issue" is used the same sense 
the words "child" and "children." ' . . . it is 
with respect to succession the two natural relation-
ship theories-the and the that 'natural 
inclinations and affections' derive from experience 
and contact-come into conflict. On the family ex-
perience and contact the relativrs of the adoptive 
parents, lineal and become the relatives of the 
adopted child. , the grandparents, 
uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters and cousins he knows. His 
genetic grandparents, brothers. sisters and 
other relatives in a sizable of ea,,rs of illegitimate 
birth will not even have been a;vare of his existence; and in 
many other instances will lHlTe known him only very briefly 
prior to his surrender for a very young infant. 
Moreover, even if property is to genes, collaterals 
would have to excluded since inherit the genes 
being followed but were drawn from a 
common stock. (but all 
other collateral relatives as well) on the common family 
experience and contact theory, must 
be those of the adoptive born before or after 
the adoption or even if ( 6 Hastings 
L.J. 261, 276.) [ 4] Moreover words in a private instru-
ment should ordinarily, in the of a showing of a con-
trary intent, be given the effect them by the statutory 
or case law. § ; iV einreich Estate Co. 
v. A. J. Johnston Co., 28 J46 r151 P. 667]) and 
this is applied to wills: provisions should 
be construed as far as with law and public 
policy .•.. 'l'he testator bound know existing statutes 
affecting testamentary dispositions. . .. " ( 95 C.J .S., Wills, 
§ 589.) The same should be true as to whether lawful issue 
includes adopted children: "In ascertaining the testator's in-
522 0.2d 
may be considered. 
'issue' or 'lawful issue' may in~ 
"In some in which statutes entitle the adopted 
child to succeed to the estate of the parents in the 
same manner as if it had been a natural child of such parent 
•.. the term ' as used in its sense of lineal 
descendants will include an child." (95 
C.J.S., Wills, § 666 .) We cannot suppose that 
wills are made in a vacuum; that the status of an adopted 
child being the same as a offspring, which is the 
public policy of the may be completely ignored, or that 
it was ignored by a testator when making a will any more 
than he may be said to ignore many other rules of law and 
public policy. When he has not said anything about 
"adopted" children using that word or the equivalent, the 
court in seeking his intent is in fact endeavoring to ascertain 
what his wishes would be if adopted children were called 
particularly to his mind. Lacking that, the court must as-
sume, unless a contrary intent is expressed, that he intended 
that his will would fit it and be compatible with the general 
body of the law and public policy. Otherwise the court is 
left with little if any basis for interpreting the instrument. 
[7] Courts thus, by necessity, draw on the statutes, case law 
and public policy in construing an instrument as they must 
suppose that the draftsman did not intend to pursue a cours2 
contrary to them unless he so states. The draftsman of wills 
may exclude adopted persons if he wishes. 
[8] While the will dors leave the bulk of the estate to 
blood relatives, testatrix' cousin Mrs. Cnn mings, and her son 
John, we do not find therein any indicEnion that an adopted 
child was to be excluded in view of the public policy to treat 
adopted children the same as blood children. Nor is it sig-
nificant that prior to the 1955 amendment to section 257 of 
the Probate Code it had been indicated that adopted children 
inherit from but not through their adoptive parents (see 
In re Darling, 173 Cal. 221 [159 P. 606]; Estate of Calhoun, 
44 Cal.2d 378 [282 P.2d 880]). Assuming that is correct a' 
to cases arising prior to the effective date of said amendment, 
it affords no solution here where we are concerned not with in-
heritance but rather with whether the words ''lawful issue'' 
used in a will includes an adopted child. There is no morr 
probability that a person will adopt a child than that he will 
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of the same blood 
does not assure them of a relative fitting their tastes. These 
so nebulous afford no grounds for excluding 
from the term "lawful issue." 
The order is affirmed. 
Dooling, 
concurred. 
Schauer, J., Peters, J. pro tern.,• 
and Wood (Fred B.), J. pro tem.,• 
[L.A. No. 24637. In Bank. Dec. 31, 1957.J 
CARL H. PEARSON, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS 
ANGELES et al., Respondents. 
[1] Pensions-Vested Right.-A public employe who serves under 
pension provisions of a statute or ordinance providing for 
pension payments to who are eligible for retirement 
after a designated or term of service acquires a vested 
contractual right to a substantial pension; surh right arises 
before the of the contingency whirh makes the 
pension payable. 
[2] Id.-Vested employe may not be deprived of vested 
contractual rights to a pension by a procedure which 
affords him due proces;;, including opportunity to be heard. 
[1] Vested right of 
9S A.L.R. 505; 112 
2d, Pensions, § 11; Am.Jur., 
~licK. Dig. References: 
§ 130; 8-11, 13-15] 
(8), 130; f6] Counties,§ 4; 
trative Lnw, § 3; 
54 A,L,R. 943; 
See also Cal.Jur. 
Pensions, § 4; [3] Public Officers, 
§ 35.2; [5] Public OfficPrs, §§ 32 
§~ 31, 35; [ 12 J Arlminis· 
§ 52.5; [17, 18] Counties, § 3'7.1, 
"Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
